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W

ITH the exception of a very few years, commercial aviation in
the United States has not been a profitable industry. From the
very beginning of commercial air transportation, the carriers found
that their normal revenues were insufficient to meet their operating
expenses; and every principal carrier, including the 16 certificated
trunk line carriers which now dominate our air transportation system,
has been the beneficiary of substantial direct financial aid from the
Federal Government in the form of an air mail subsidy.
Moreover, the cost of the Federal Airways has been borne by the
Federal Government, and the cost of constructing airports and related
terminal facilities has been shared between the Federal Government
and the state and local government agencies. The air carriers themselves have paid no significant part of these costs though they are admittedly the principal users of airways and airports constructed and
maintained at public expense.'
In spite of this failure to develop sufficient revenues from commercial sources, and the continuing need to rely on Government aid, the
industry has experienced remarkable growth. Prior to 1926, when the
first air mail contracts were granted, there was no scheduled commercial air transport of any consequence in this country. Today the nation
is criss-crossed with more than 140,000 miles of scheduled air routes.
How does one account for such rapid expansion of an industry that
has failed to earn enough to pay the expenses of its operation? The
answer seems to be in the policies of the Federal Government whereby
the operations of the air carriers have been subsidized. Indeed, the
policies of the Federal Government have probably contributed much
to both the expansion of our air transport system and the fact that it
has thus far failed to achieve economic self-sufficiency. For the failure
of the industry to achieve economic independence is largely a consequence of the fact that the supply of air transportation offered, in
total, has consistently exceeded the demand for such transportation,
with the exception, perhaps, of the two or three war years.
1 For specific data supporting these general statements see M. George Goodrick, "Air Mail Subsidy of Commercial Aviation," JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, Summer 1949.
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Federal Aid to commercial aviation was first accepted as an appropriate public policy on the assumption that as the industry grew it
would be able to assume the full burden of its costs of operation so
that federal aid would no longer be necessary. This expectation has
not thus far been realized. Indeed, the amount of federal aid has been
growing rather than decreasing in recent years and the role of the
Federal Government in the operations of the industry is such that the
costs to be borne by the taxpayer will probably continue to increase
rather than decrease as the volume of air transportation grows.
It is the purpose of this paper to review the growth of our air
transportation system, to call particular attention to the role of the
Federal Government in the development of air routes, and to consider
some of the reasons why federal participation has contributed to the
expansion of air transportation services beyond the point which the
demand for such services will support.
1938
Postal Service Beginnings
EXPERIENCE BEFORE

Commercial aviation in the United States received its most important early stimulus from the efforts of the Post Office Department
to demonstrate the benefits and practicability of transporting mail
2
by air.
The first regularly scheduled air mail flight took place on May 15,
1918, from New York to Washington, a distance of about 218 miles.
In 1919 service was begun on air routes west of New York and within
a few years thereafter regular transcontinental air mail service was being maintained by the Post Office Department from New York to San
Francisco, via Cleveland, Chicago, Omaha, and Cheyenne. The Post
Office Department owned and maintained its own planes, it surveyed
and charted the first air routes, and designed, built, installed and maintained the air navigation facilities required for its operations, including rotating beacon lights and air-ground radio communication facilities.
By 1925 the air mail service was well established under Post Office
Department operation. The Postmaster General believed the time had
come when it could safely and properly be transferred to private operators. The Air Mail Act of 1925 authorized him to contract with
private carriers for the transportation of mail by air at rates not to
exceed four-fifths of the revenue derived from such mail service.
Private air carriers, however, were reluctant to assume responsibility for the maintenance of air navigation facilities along the transcontinental route. The Air Commerce Act of 1926 assigned this
responsibility to the Department of Commerce, and thereafter the
2 For a summary of this experience see the annual report of the Postmaster

General for the Fiscal Year 1927, pp. 27 et seq. U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
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transfer of the air mail service to private contractors was rapidly accomplished. By September 1, 1927, the transfer was complete.
Early Contract Operations
The Post Office Department had inaugurated and maintained air
mail service over routes where the advantages of such service were
fairly obvious. Its principal operations were over the transcontinental
route described above. Shorter routes were established from time to
time but these were mostly discontinued, unless they fed directly into
the transcontinental route, because the time saved in transporting the
mail was not regarded as sufficient to warrant the expense involved..
The announcement that air mail contracts were to be let to private carriers stimulated a great increase in interest on the part of the
public in 1926. This interest was further stimulated by Col. Lindbergh's historic flight from New York to Paris in May of 1927. City
governments and chambers of commerce were encouraged by the business men of their communities to petition the Post Office Department
for air mail service. Many of these communities undertook the construction of airports.
During the fiscal year 1926, nine air mail contracts were awarded
and put into operation as follows: 8
1) Chicago-St. Louis
2) Chicago-Dallas (via Kansas City and Wichita)
3) Salt Lake City-Los Angeles (via Las Vegas)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)

Elko, Nevada-Pasco, Washington (via Boise)
Detroit-Cleveland
Detroit-Chicago'
Chicago-Minneapolis (via Milwaukee, LaCrosse and St. Paul)
Jacksonville-Miami (via Fort Myers)
Cheyenne-Pueblo (via Denver and Colorado Springs)

Because many of these routes fed into the transcontinental service,
which was still being operated by the Post Office Department, an increase in capacity along that route was required.
During the fiscal year 1927, additional operations were begun
4
under contract as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Boston-New York (via Hartford)
Philadelphia-Washington
Philadelphia-Norfolk (via Washington)
Seattle-Los Angeles (via Portland and San Francisco)
Cleveland-Pittsburgh (via Youngstown)

The route from Jacksonville to Miami was extended to include
Atlanta and Macon, Georgia. By September, 1927, the last segment
of the transcontinental route had also been transferred to contract
operations.
s Annual Report of the Postmaster General, Fiscal Year ended June 30,
1926, p. 26.
4 Annual Report of Postmaster General for Fiscal Year 1927, p. 27.
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During the years 1926 through 1930 the air transport system was
expanded rapidly by the granting of new air mail contracts and the
extension of existing contracts by the Post Office Department. Contracts were let to the lowest qualified bidder in each case, after routes
had been surveyed, and bids had been invited by public advertisement.
Much difficulty was soon encountered. Although the first Air Mail
Act had provided that payments to carriers should not exceed fourfifths of the revenues derived from air mail service, it was soon demonstrated that such amounts would be inadequate to meet the costs of
the contracting carriers. Successive amendments to the Air Mail Act
authorized the Postmaster General to establish other bases of payments.
The prevailing assumption remained, however, that the air mail service ought to be self-supporting.
In his report for the fiscal year 1928, for instance, the Postmaster
General stated: 5
"Growing interest (in the air mail service) is indicated by the
increasing number of applications from cities for new routes, the
commendable interest of so many cities in facilities for air mail
fields, and the desire of post offices for extension of service for supply on existing routes. While this interest is gratifying to the department, it must be conceded that so far as the wish to advance
commercial aviation is concerned, it must yield to the necessity for
considering the establishment of routes from a postal revenues
standpoint.6 This is necessary to insure the continuous operation

by the contractors who must make considerable outlay of funds
for the purchase of the necessary ground and flying equipment."

During the fiscal year 1929 there was established an inter-departmental committee to consider petitions for the establishment of additional civil airways. This committee included three members from
the Post Office Department and three from the Department of Commerce. 7 The establishment of such a committee suggests that new air
routes were thenceforth to be established on the basis of broader considerations than air mail service alone. On June 12, 1929, for instance,
hearings were held before this committee to consider the establishment of air mail services in various parts of the South and Southwest.
These hearings were attended by more than a score of Senators and
Congressmen, virtually all of whom "pledged their support . . .and

promised generous appropriations. Delegations from the cities concerned added their arguments."'
By amendment of August 1, 1928, to the Air Mail Act of 1925,
the Postmaster General had been authorized to issue route certificates
to contract carriers who had satisfactorily performed air mail services
for two years or more. This relieved the carriers of the risk that they
5P. 28.
6 Underscoring supplied.

7 Annual Report of the Postmaster General for the Fiscal Year 1929, p. 23.
8 Air Commerce Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, July 1, 1929, p. 21: published by the

Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce.
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might be under-bid and encouraged them to undertake greater capital
commitments. Rates for carrying the mail under such certificates were
to be negotiated between the carrier and the Post Office Department.
These rates, however, were not to exceed those established by the
original contract.
Watres Act of 1930

The Watres Act of 1930 reaffirmed the authority of the Postmaster
General to issue certificates in lieu of contracts. It authorized payments
to carriers on a space-mile rather than on a plane-mile basis, however,
and thereby deliberately provided the means whereby payments to
carriers could exceed by substantial amounts the revenues earned from
air mail business.
Although there was considerable evidence to indicate that air mail
contractors had incurred losses on their efforts to provide passenger
transportation, the Watres Act specifically provided that all air mail
carriers must provide passenger service, and by July 1, 1931, all but
two such carriers had complied with these provisions of the Act.9
The Watres Act authorized the Postmaster General to consolidate
and extend existing air mail routes with a view to establishing a more
adequate air transportation system throughout the United States. Pursuant to this authority the Postmaster General adopted a vigorous
policy for the extension of air mail service, so that by June 30, 1932,
air mail routes covered approximately 26,745 miles. The Postmaster
General at this time, though opposed to subsidies as a long range
policy, believed that by the use of a deliberate subsidy policy for a
short period he could induce the general public to use air transportation and thus get the industry onto a firm basis of economic self-sufficiency.' 0
In his report for the fiscal year 1932 the Postmaster General said:"
"The Post Office' Department is not only improving the communication system of the United States, but by promoting an economically independent aviation industry it is making a substantial

contribution to the peace and security of the country."

The methods used by the Postmaster General during this period in
his relationships with the principal air mail certificate holders, led to
charges of fraud and collusion and on February 19, 1934 all air mail
contracts and certificates were annulled by his successor. During the
Spring of that year the air mail service was operated by the Army on
an emergency basis until commercial operations could be re-established
under the Air Mail Act of 1934, which was enacted June 12 of that
year.
9

Annual Report of the Postmaster General for the Fiscal Year 1931, p. 33.

10 For a detailed consideration of this point of view see Henry Ladd Smith,

Airways, Alfred A. Knopf, 1942, especially Chapters 13 and 14.
12 P. 31; underscoring supplied.
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Air Mail Act of 1934

Under the provisions of the Air Mail Act of 1934 the Interstate
Commerce Commission was given responsibility for reviewing air mail
rates each year in order to prevent unreasonable profits to the carriers,
and to establish or revise air routes under certain circumstances. The
Postmaster General retained authority to award contracts to the lowest responsible bidders for air mail routes and to enforce air mail
regulations. Maintainance and operation of the Federal Airways remained a responsibility of the Department of Commerce.
Much confusion resulted under this arrangement. On August 30,
1935, for example, Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc., applied
for authority to inaugurate and maintain an off-line, or spur service
in connection with its operations over Air Mail Route #2 (Albuquerque to San Francisco via Winslow, Arizona and Las Vegas, Nevada). The Interstate Commerce Commission denied this application
on the ground that it would compete with passenger and express service available on other air mail routes. Transcontinental and Western
Air, Inc., thereupon made a bid of 1 mill per airplane mile to provide
air mail service over this route and was awarded a contract by the Post
2
Office Department.

The Air Mail Act of 1934 specifically provided that on and after
July 1, 1938, air mail payments should no longer exceed air mail revenues. In accordance with this objective the Interstate Commerce
Commission appears to have exercised a restraining influence over the
expansion of air transportation services. The growth of traffic was
substantial but the increase in air route mileage was limited.
Reports of the Commission to the Congress repeatedly expressed
dissatisfaction with the division of authority under the Air Mail Act
of 1934 and urged the enactment of new legislation which would provide for control over the expansion of air routes on the basis of .certificates of public convenience and necessity such as were provided for
in the case of rail transportation by the Transportation Act of 1920.13
EXPERIENCE UNDER THE AERONAUTICS

ACT

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938

Section 401 (a) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which became
effective August 10, provides that "no air carrier shall engage in any
air transportation unless there is in force a certificate issued by the
Authority (now the Civil Aeronautics Board) authorizing such air
carrier to engage in such transportation.,"
Section 401(d) (1) of the Act provides that "The Authority
shall issue a certificate authorizing the whole or any part of the
transportation covered by an application, if it finds that the appli12 See 213 ICC 551 and 214 ICC 552.
13 See Annual Reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1935,

1936, and 1937.
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cant is fit, willing, and able to perform such transportation properly, and to conform to the provisions of this Act and the rules,
regulations, and requirements of the authority hereunder, and
that such transportationis required by the public convenience and
necessity ... " 14
The recommendations of the Interstate Commerce Commission on
this point were thus adopted by the Congress. Other provisions of the
Act, however, went much further, apparently, than the Interstate Commerce Commission had contemplated 15 and reflect the influence of the
industry itself and other interested groups on the drafting of the legislation.
Section 2 of the Act, for instance, requires that "the encouragement
and development of an air transportation system," the "promotion of
adequate, economical, and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges," and the "encouragement and development of civil aeronautics" are to be considered "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with public convenience and necessity." This Section of the
Act also provides that the Authority shall provide competition in air
transportation "to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted to the needs
of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the
Postal Service, and of the National Defense."
Section 406 (b) of the Act provides that in fixing fair and reasonable rates of compensation for the carrying of mail, the Authority shall
include, among other considerations, "the need of each such air carrier
for compensation for the transportation of mail sufficient to insure thf
performance of such service, and, together with all the other revenue
of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under honest, economical,
and efficient management, to maintain and continue the development
of air transportation to the extent and of the character and quality
required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal Service,
and the National defense."
It is this latter section which provides the basis of the air mail subsidy, that guarantees air mail payments to every air mail carrier sufficient to ensure its solvency, "under honest, economical, and efficient
management."
Public Convenience and Necessity
Historically, certificates of public convenience and necessity have
been utilized to prevent the excessive development of service on the
part of public utilities, or the too rapid installation of service or equipment. The objective is to prevent the development of a cost structure
for such an industry greater than the traffic can bear.' 6
14

Underscoring supplied.

15 See Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission for 1938, p. 52.

16 See Stuart Daggett, Principles of Inland Transportation, 3rd ed., p. 254ff,
Harper & Bros., 1941.
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The State of New York was the first to adopt this device to regulate the expansion (and contraction) of railroad facilities. The power
to issue such certificates for the operation of railroads was granted to
the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Transportation Act of
1920. Similar powers for the regulation of motor vehicle carriers were
given the Interstate Commerce Commission by the Motor Carrier Act
of 1935, and water transportation services are similarly controlled by
the Commission pursuant to provisions of the Transportation Act of
1940.
Presumably it was the intention of those who urged the inclusion
of such a provision in the Civil Aeronautics Act that it should be used
to prevent the over-expansion of the air transport industry. The Civil
Aeronautics Authority acknowledged such a purpose when it said in
an early decision:1

7

"Congress . . . clearly intended to avoid the duplication of

transportation facilities and services, the wasteful competitive
practices, such as the opening of non-productive routes, and other
uneconomic results which characterized the development of other
modes of transportation prior to the time of their governmental
regulation."

The Authority also recognized that the administration of certificates of convenience and necessity under the circumstances prescribed
by the Civil Aeronautics'Act would be difficult. In its first Annual Report (1939) the Authority stated:
"These applications . . . involving 'a form of transportation

which will derive assurance of economic survival through the payment of air mail compensation, raise new problems in connection
with the concept of the public convenience and necessity."

It is useful to compare the premises on which applications for certificates of public convenience and necessity have been considered by
the Civil Aeronautics Board and by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
In several of its early decisions 's the Civil Aeronautics Authority
held that the important factors to be considered were as follows:
1) Whether the service will serve a useful public service, responsive
to a public need;
2) Whether this service can and will be served adequately by existing
carriers;
3) Whether it can be served by the applicant without impairing operations of existing carriers contrary to the public interest; and
4) Whether the cost of the proposed service to the Government will be
outweighed by the benefit which will accrue to the public from
the new service.
The criteria relied upon by the Interstate Commerce Commission
in its consideration of new routes, have been summarized as follows: 9
1' Duluth-Twin Cities Operation, 1 CAA 573, 577 (1940)
supplied).
18 See for instance CAA Docket 245, Sept. 17, 1940.
19 Daggett, op. cit, p. 258.

(underscoring
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1) Whether they are likely to be self-sustaining;
2) Whether they will divert traffic from existing facilities;
3) Whether the proposed undertaking is adequately financed.
It is evident that the criteria used by the Civil Aeronautics Board
provide very inadequate policy guides as compared to those used by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. The most important consideration seems to be the first criterion listed in each case. For the Interstate Commerce Commission this matter is reduced to a question of
whether the new route can be expected to pay its own way. For the
Civil Aeronautics Board the first criterion involves an independent
administrative determination of public need; and the question of
whether the new service will pay its own way is not decisive.
It seems fair to assume that carriers who apply for new routes under
regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission will be proceeding
on the expectation that revenues from the new services will be sufficient to cover the costs; at least that the additional business derived
from the new service will result in some direct benefit to the carrier.
Thus the carrier itself has assumed the major portion of the burden
of appraising the public need for the proposed service.
A similar assumption is not warranted in 'the case of applications
submitted to the Civil Aeronautics Board. For in such cases the carrier
does not need to rely entirely on the revenues earned by the proposed
service. The Government, under the provisions of Section 406 (b) of
the. Civil Aeronautics Act, has given assurances that so long as the
management of the carrier is "honest, economical, and efficient" aiiy
mail pay will be adjusted to ensure adequate income for the carrier.
In every extension of air transportation service, therefore, it is the Federal Government rather than the carrier that assumes the risk of unwise expansion.
This situation is further complicated by the fact that although the
Civil Aeronautics Board may limit the routes over which air travel
is provided it may not restrict the number of schedules offered by the
carriers concerned or the capacity offered on each flight, for, as provided in Section 401 (f) of the Civil Aeronautics Act:
"No term, condition, or limitation of a certificate shall restrict
the right of a carrier to add to or change schedules, equipment,
accommodations, and facilities for performing the authorized transportation and service as the development of the business and the
demands of the public shall require."
The importance of this provision is immediately evident when it
is pointed out that the 'amount of air transportation service offered
was probably more than doubled, without consideration by the Civil
Aeronautics Board, when larger aircraft were put into service by the
principal carriers during the years 1945, 1946, and 1947.
The powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission with respect
to certificates of public convenience and necessity have been more fre-
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quently used, in railroad cases at least, to prevent the carriers from
abandoning service than to authorize extensions in service. The rail
transportation system of this country was substantially complete when
the Transportation Act of 1920 was enacted. In some areas it had been
over-built, and carriers have frequently sought to discontinue service
on routes that have proved to be unprofitable. The powers of the
Commission may be used in such cases to force the continuation of a
service on which the public has come to rely, even though the revenues
fail to cover the costs. The carrier is thus forced to assume the social
burdens arising from its unwise expansion or from changes that have
rendered its service in some measure obsolete.
In new route cases the Interstate Commerce Commission has relied
primarily upon evidence that new routes would be self-sustaining.
This means, in effect, that public convenience and necessity are to be
defined in market terms. If the demand for the service is sufficient
to support it, this fact stands as prima facie evidence of the need.
The Civil Aeronautics Board, on the other hand, has been unwilling to rely on such a criterion of need. Presumably this is a result of
the fact that the Board is charged with responsibility for "promoting"
as well, as "regulating" air commerce, and this suggests that perhaps
air routes were to be established in anticipation of demand for air
transportation, as a part of a general program for encouraging greater
utilization of such services. The subsidy benefits provided were evidently intended to sustain the carriers until the demand for air trans0portation services was sufficient to meet the costs.
CAB Procedure in Route Cases
When an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity
is received by the Board it is assigned to an examiner who makes an
investigation of the need for the service and may afford interested
parties, in addition to the carrier, an opportunity to state their views.
A variety of evidence has been used to evaluate the need for air
transportation services. On September 17, 1940, for instance, the Civil
Aeronautics Board granted to Pennsylvania Central Airlines a certificate of public convenience and necessity "authorizing it to engage in
air transportation of persons, property, and mail between the terminal
point of Norfolk, Va., the intermediate points of Rocky Mount, Raleigh, Greensboro, and Asheville, N.C., and the terminal point, Knoxville, Tenn. ' 20 The factors considered by the Board in this case may
be summarized as follows:
1) the population of North Carolina;
2) Federal taxes paid by citizens of North Carolina;
3) the growth of industry in North Carolina;
4) the volume of tourist traffic, especially to the Great Smoky
Mountains;
5) the amount spent for highway development;
6) the industrial and commercial importance of the terminal cities
20 II CAB 207.
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7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)

(here specific reference was made to operations at the Norfolk
Naval base) ;
the importance of the intermediate cities;
the population of such cities (to a radius of thirty miles from the
center);
a comparison of train time, bus time, proposed air time, noting
the savings to result;
flow of traffic among the several cities; as determined by an analysis
of bus and train tickets sold;
hotel registrations (noting the community of interest among the
several cities) ;
the extent of existing air service (none along this particular route);
the volume of mail along the route; and
the probable costs and revenues to be derived from the service as
estimated by the carrier.

Similar evidence was considered with respect to the establishment
of air transportation service between the Twin Cities, Des Moines,
Kansas City and St. Louis. 21 This case, decided July 18, 1940, involved
applications from Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines,
Inc., and Braniff Airways, Inc., for the inauguration of air services
over slightly different routes through this general area. This case,
therefore, involved a comparison of the relative merits of the services
proposed by the several interested carriers. It resulted in the granting
of a certificate to Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., and a denial of the
other applications.
Although the Civil Aeronautics Act requires that the Civil Aeronautics Board give consideration to the defense requirements of the
United States, no evidence of specific testimony on this point was
found in the perusal of a considerable number of typical route cases.
Insofar as it is practicable to undertake a prior determination of
the need for air transportation services, it appears that the techniques
used by the Board are not inappropriate. However, it seems fair to
challenge the validity of the Board's judgment as to the need for such
services in those cases where subsidy aid is still required after an extended period of service over the route.
The growth of our air transportation system while administered
by the Civil Aeronautics Board is evident from the following table. 22
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
21

(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)
(miles)

II CAB 63.

Trunk Routes
39,267
39,782
44,643
46,453
49,297
54,502
62,937
67,149
79,485
111,786
115,484

FeederRoutes
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
12.043
15,998
23,088

Total
39,267
39,782
44,643
46,453
49,297
54,502
62,937
67,149
91,582
127,784
138,572

Adapted from Dearing and Owen, "National Transportation Policy," p.
203, Brookings Institution, 1949.
22
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It is evident from this table that the Civil Aeronautics Board pursued a relatively conservative policy during the early years of its existence in the matter of air route extensions. The total increase in
authorized route mileage during the first five years amounted to only
about 39%/ over the base year. The increase from 1943 through 1948,
however, amounted to 84,070 route miles or an increase of approximately 154%/ over the authorized mileage in 1934. It appears that the
Board relaxed its restraining influence just at the time when it was
most needed, i.e. when the plans and ambitions of air carrier officials
were over-stimulated by the abnormally favorable experience of the
war years.
It is also important to note that nearly all the increase in route
mileage was accomplished by extension of the certificates of the sixteen
line carriers. These are the carriers whose basic route patterns were
certificated by the Civil Aeronautics Authority under the "Grandfather
clause" of the Civil Aeronautics Act. This clause provided in effect
that the Authority should issue certificates of public convenience and
necessity to any carrier which had been continuously engaged in scheduled air transportation prior to the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act.
Competition
The supply of air transportation available at any time depends
not only on the number of miles of authorized routes, but also, as indicated above, on the frequency of the schedules and the capacity of
the equipment used. It will also tend to be increased if there is competition among carriers between the principal air terminals.
Although it was evidently the intention of the Congress to prevent
unwarranted duplication of service in the development of air routes,
it was also the express intention of the Congress that there should be
competition among air carriers, "to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air transportation system properly adapted
to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States.
of the Postal Service, and of the National defense." The Congress was
evidently unwilling to rely on either competition or regulation to accomplish its purpose and so provided expressly that both types of control were to be utilized.
Pursuant to this Congressional statement of policy, the Civil Aeronautics Board has issued certificates which have resulted in increasing
substantially the number of "city-pairs" for which competition is provided. Messrs. Gill and Bates, Research Fellows at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration found that in September 1940
competition existed among the air lines for 41% of the revenue generated by passenger travel. 23 By September 1947 this ratio had increased to nearly 60%.
28 Gill, F. W., and Bates, C. L., Airline Competition, p. 22, Graduate School

of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1949.
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In some cases, as for instance on service between Chicago and
Washington, as many as four carriers are in competition with each
other,24 and there are many instances in which the traveler has a choice
among three carriers. Gill and Bates concluded that, in general, "competition has been one of the most important factors influencing the
industry.' '25 They point out, however, that competition amongst air
carriers has been a major factor in preventing their achievement of
economic self-sufficiency. According to their analysis the excellent
earnings record of Eastern Airlines, with all due respect to the superiority of its, management, is in large part attributable to the fact that
Eastern's route pattern is the least competitive of those of the "Big
Four" carriers.

26

It seems self-evident that competition will frequently result in
excess capacity with consequent low load-factors for each of the competing carriers. The convenience of travelers requires, for instance,
that planes depart from Washington for Chicago, or vice versa, in the
late afternoon or early evening. To capture its share of this business
each carrier will offer one or more schedules during these hours. If
each of the four cariers uses a plane with a capacity of fifty passengers,
a total of 200 seats will be offered. If only 100 passengers choose to
make the trip during these hours on any day, the average load-factor
for the several carriers on that day will be fifty per cent- which is
well below the break-even point. A single carrier, however, could use
as many planes as the circumstances warranted on each flight and
might thereby achieve a utilization of capacity which would be well
above his break-even point.
The Civil Aeronautics Board in the establishment of competition
among air carriers as a means of improving service at low rates, seems
to have ignored for the most part the fact that nearly every air route
operates in direct competition with rail and/or motor services.
Modification, Suspension or Revocation
Section 401 (h) of the Civil Aeronautics Act provides that the
Authority (now the Board) "upon petition or complaint or upon its
own initiative, after notice and hearing, may alter, amend, modify, or
suspend" a carrier's certificate in whole or in part, "if the public convenience and necessity so require, or may revoke any such certificate
in whole or in part, for intentional failure to comply with any provisions of this title or any order, rule, or regulation issued hereunder or
any term, condition, or limitation of such certificate," provided that
any carrier shall be afforded reasonable time in which to comply with
a specific order of the Board "commanding obedience."
This provision affords a broad grant of authority pursuant to
which the Civil Aeronautics Board might, on its own motion, make
Ibid., p. 102.
24
25
Ibid., p. 615.
26 Ibid., p. 619-620.
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whatever revisions of the air route structure it regarded as required
by the public convenience and necessity. The Board has made but
little use of this authority. In the fall of 1948, however, it did undertake an investigation of the air route pattern of National Airlines, Inc.,
seeking to determine whether the interests of aviation might be better
served by the transfer of National's property and various segments of
its route system to other carriers. 2 7 While hearings in this case were
being held, National Airlines announced that it had reached agreements with Pan American and Pan American Grace Airways for an
interchange of equipment at Miami. Subsequently the Board gave
consideration to proposals for an agreement between National Airlines
and Eastern Airlines for cooperative service on east-west routes through
New Orleans. This aspect of the case is still pending.
The carriers themselves have applied from time to time for authority to consolidate their own route patterns and the Board has generally
acted favorably on such applications.

2s

The Board has made from time to time, systematic surveys of the
traffic actually carried by the certificated carriers. These surveys, suspended during the war, have been made at six month intervals since
March 1946. They include a summary of the total traffic for the
survey month, by types, for each carrier between each of the stations
served by the carrier. They also include data concerning the number
of flights and the total revenue capacity made available as compared
to the volume of traffic actually carried. Such data provide some statistical evidences of the public need supporting each route segment.
They might conceivably serve as the basis for a general reconsideration
of the validity of the existing route structure. As indicated above, however, the Board has not thus far undertaken such a program.
"Feeder" Routes
Because of the many applications it had received for the initiation
of local or "feeder" air line services, the Civil Aeronautics Board began
an investigation of this problem in 1943. The Board found that the
air traffic potential of small cities was too small to support such service
in most instances and that such routes, if established, would have to
compete with surface transportation systems under circumstances where
the speed of air travel would not afford much of an advantage. 29 The
establishment of "feeder" services was, therefore, rejected at that time.
Immediately following the end of the Second World War there was
much interest in the idea that our aviation achievements during the
27 Adams, Russell B. (CAB member), "The Air Route Pattern Problem,"
Spring 1950, p. 129. See also CAB, "National Route Transfer Case," Order Serial No. E. 2025 (9/28/48) and Order
Serial No. E. 2228 (11/24/48).
28 Cf 7 CAB 337, American Airlines et al. (Sept. 23, 1946) and 8 CAB 28,
TWA et al. (May 19, 1947).
29 See Locklin, D. Philip, "Economics of Transportation,"' Richard D. Irwin,
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE,

Inc., Chicago (1947), p. 828.
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war might somehow be translated into the rapid development and expansion of commercial aviation. Influenced, no doubt, by the same
optimism which resulted in a great increase in certificated route miles
for trunk line carriers, the Board reconsidered the question of feeder
lines and the first of such service was authorized in 1946. By the end
carriers had been certificated for about 23,000
of 1946 some 28 "feeder"
30
service.
local
of
miles
The record of these carriers has shown that most of them have
been unable to develop satisfactory load factors and have been obliged
to rely heavily on mail pay to meet their expenses.
Influence of the Civil Aeronautics Administration
The Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Department of Commerce has performed since 1940 the functions that were first assigned
to that Department by the Air Commerce Act of 1926. These are primarily concerned with the construction, maintenance and operation
of air navigation facilities. The Civil Aeronautics Administration, and
its predecessor agencies in the Department of Commerce, have also
played an influential role, however, in the construction of airports.
Under the Federal Airports Act of 1946, the CAA is administering
a matched funds, grant-in-aid program for the construction and improvement of airports. The Federal Airport Plan for 1949 included
aid for 4,977 airports, of which 2,749 represented new locations. 8 1
As a part of its responsibility for the administration of the $500,000,000 authorized for these purposes the Civil Aeronautics Administration undertook a series of studies for the purpose of appraising
the air traffic potentials of the cities of the United States. The results
of these studies were published in the fall of 1949. 3 2 They provide one
set of factors used by the CAA in selecting the municipal airport
construction projects which are entitled to Federal Aid.
For the most part the CAA has been engaged in constructing air
navigation facilities over routes previously certificated by the Civil
Aeronautics Board. Through its control over the construction of air
terminal facilities, however, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may
be in a position to take the initiative in some instances, by providing
air terminal facilities at cities which carriers will desire to have included in their certificated route patterns.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There seems to be general agreement among many students of the
subject that the air transportation system of this country has suffered
80 Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report for 1948, p. 9, and p. 17, above.
81 Dearing and Owen, op. cit., p. 34. The total number of airports as of
December 1, 1948 was 6,009. Of this number only 567 were large enough to accomodate the larger types of aircraft now in service.
82 Airport Planning Series, Civil Aeronautics Administration, 1949.
It
appears that these studies were completed without any official collaboration with
the CAB.
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in recent years from over-expansion. Dearing and Owen, in their study
of "National Transportation Policy," observed that one of the major
objectives of the Civil Aeronautics Act was to prevent the development
of excess and duplicate air transportation facilities. It seemed apparent
to them "that the Board has not achieved impressive results in this
undertaking." 83
The President's Air Policy Commission reported in 1948: "The
difficulties in which the air transport industry now finds itself can be
traced primarily to over-expansion based on the mistaken assumptions
of postwar traffic." 84 Mr. Russell Adams, then a member of the CAB,
writing for the JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE, in the Spring
of 1950, acknowledged that the certificated route pattern had been
over-expanded. He put the blame however, on the airlines, pointing
out that the Board had acted in every instance on application for route
extensions, and that the extensions authorized were substantially less
than those applied for."5
It is worth emphasis at this point that the problems of the air lines
are not altogether a postwar phenomenon. Studies of air line operations for the pre-war years disclose that subsidy aid was essential for
commercial aviation from the time of the first air mail contracts.3 6
This fact suggests that the supply of air transportation has been consistently expanded more rapidly than the demand for it.
A number of reasons may be offered to account for the consistent
excess in the supply of air transportation.
1. First of all, air transportation was not developed in response
to an obvious need. The industry, with Government encouragement,
has had to foster the development of a demand for its services, at a time
when the basic transportation requirements of the country were being
fairly well met by motor and rail facilities. With the exception of a few
isolated instances the airlines have not "opened up" new territory as
the railroads did. Shippers have never exerted pressures on the CAB
as they have on the Interstate Commerce Commission because air
transportation has never been so clearly related to their welfare.
2. Although carriers prefer profits to losses, of course, they have
not had to bear the risks Which attend the expansion of other types of
business enterprises. If it appeared to a carrier that his earnings might
be improved by extending his service, he could proceed, especially
since the enactment of the Civil Aeronautics Act, with the assurance
that such expansion could not seriously impair his financial welfare
if his hopes for better revenues were not realized.
31 Dearing and Owen, op. cit., p. 200.
34 "Survival in the Air Age," a Report by the President's Air Policy Commission, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1948, p. 100.
35 Adams, Russell B., op. cit., p. 132.
86 See Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Public Aids to Transportation, U.S. Gov't Printing Office (1940). Vol. 1, Part 2; also Board of Investigation and Research, "Public Aids to Domestic Transportation," House Doc. No.
159, 79th Congress, 1st Sess. (1945), U.S. Gov't Printing Office.
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This is perhaps the crux of the matter, and there is some reason
to suspect that the supply of air transportation will never be appropriately adjusted to the demand for it so long as the subsidy provisions
remain. Mr. Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., formerly Chairman of the CAB,
said in an address in New York City on March 23, 1949, "Bankruptcy
is, after all, in private enterprise, the principal astringent that we have
for washing away uneconomic operations. In the air transportation
business, as it is conducted today, this astringent is no stronger than
water."
3. The President's Air Policy Commission reported, in 1948,
"There is ...

a widespread confusion as to the principles which guide

the Civil Aeronautics Board in its route determinations." 87 This
confusion is attributable in large part to the fact that the Civil Aeronautics Board is charged with responsibility for "promoting" as well
as regulating air commerce. The Board's experience over a period of
twelve years warrants some doubt as to whether any single agency
of Government can effectively perform simultaneously two functions
so clearly divergent.
The problem of the Board is complicated by the administrative
environment in which it operates. It is under constant pressure from
the air carriers for modifications of policies and -routes which will serve
their private purposes. Few persons come before the Board, on the
other hand, to speak for the public generally. Yet it is the taxpaying
public which is obligated to meet whatever costs the Government
may incur if the carriers fail to pay their way.
The Board is sometimes required, of course, to rule in favor of
some applicants and against others in the matter of route extensions.
It is seldom called upon, however, to hear arguments against route
extensions per se.. It is not surprising therefore that the extension of
routes has gone forward, pretty much as the carriers have urged, for
the taxpayers, who assume the risk of unwise extensions, have no part
in the proceedings. Moreover, as noted above, the policies of the
Board are rarely subjected to pressure and criticism from shippers or
travelers such as those exerted on the Interstate Commerce Commission in rail and motor cases.
SUGGESTIONS

It is not the purpose of this paper to propose detailed remedies for
the economic and administrative issues involved in the Government's
promotion and regulation of air transportation. Congressional Committees are currently working on this general problem. 88 Two suggestions seem to warrant consideration, however, as possible steps
toward a solution within the framework of existing legislation:
1. Decisions of the Civil Aeronautics Board as to whether any
87 Survival in the Air Age, p. 10.

8sEspecially the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
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route extension is warranted by public convenience and necessity
should be subject to review and revision on the basis of experience.
The Board has developed elaborate techniques for appraising in
advance the need for air transportation services. It is authorized to
certificate routes where the immediate demand will not support the
costs of the service to be offered, and to adjust rates of mail pay to
cover the difference. It seems logical to assume, however, that after
a period of operation and development over any given route the volume of traffic actually generated might become the measure of need
for the service, and the risk of continuing operations over the route
might be transferred to the carrier.
A period of from two to five years might be established as sufficient
time for the need for air transportation to be demonstrated by the
actual volume of traffic carried. Subsidy benefits could be paid during
such a period with the understanding that they would be withdrawn
thereafter, and the carrier could be afforded some option as to whether
the service should then be continued.
It is recognized that such a plan would call for careful allocation
of a carrier's costs among its several route segments, but it is believed
that this problem is not insurmountable. Adoption of such a plan,
on the other hand, would ultimately bring about an air route system
adapted to the bona fide demand for air travel. The Bill recently
introduced by Senator Johnson (S. 1657) offers one approach to this
problem. It requires that carriers support their requests for subsidy by
identifying the cities which they serve where the cost .of the service is
not covered by the revenues derived therefrom.
2. In the event, after such a period of development, the carrier
elected to discontinue the service, the needs of the Post Office
Department and of the Department of National Defense might
be more specifically considered with the understanding that these
agencies would then be required to stipulate just how much
service over the route was necessary for their purposes. Subsidy
benefits sufficient to maintain such services could then be paid
with more assurance of the public benefit to be derived therefrom
than is now the case.
The Air Route Problem is not the most pressing issue confronting
the Federal Government today. It is representative, however, of many
situations in which special interests have sought to use the Government as a means for promoting their individual welfare at the expense,
sometimes at least, of the general public. It illustrates, too, the problems that may arise when administrative determinations are substituted for market processes. Our efforts to deal with this situation may
therefore afford some measure of the ability of democratic government
to cope adequately with the complex problems of our time.

